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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 Toward the end of each calendar year, people around the 
world celebrate what has come to be known as "the holiday 
season."  Some do so by adorning their lawns with various 





convey an individual's interpretation of the holiday season.  
Thus, while some may subtly express an acknowledgement of the 
season through a lighted tree or a candle in a window, others may 
prefer a dazzling array of lights, ornaments, and a cast of 
religious and secular characters. 
 Although the Constitution provides no guidance on 
matters of taste or aesthetics, it does provide protection for 
citizens to erect even the most energy-consuming, 
taste-challenged holiday display.  In particular, the Free 
Exercise Clause guarantees the citizen's right to celebrate the 
season's religious origins.  This right is reinforced by the 
Establishment Clause, which prevents the government from imposing 
its religious will upon its citizens.  Thus, while the individual 
citizen can express himself or herself freely during the holiday 
season through the display of religious symbols, the 
Establishment Clause imposes constraints on the content of 
government-sponsored holiday displays.  By restricting government 
displays, the Establishment Clause prevents government from 
sponsoring, celebrating, or endorsing religion. 
 The uncertain contours of these Establishment Clause 
restrictions virtually guarantee that on a yearly basis, 
municipalities, religious groups, and citizens will find 
themselves embroiled in legal and political disputes over the 
content of municipal displays.  As a result, threats of municipal 
display lawsuits and restraining orders have become almost as 





 In this case, we must determine whether the City of 
Jersey City, New Jersey, should be permitted to erect a display 
containing a crèche and a menorah on the lawn in front of its 
City Hall.  We will affirm the district court's holding that the 
City's original display of the crèche and the menorah violated 
the Establishment Clause.  In addition, we will hold that the 
district court applied the wrong standard to determine that the 
City's second display, which added Santa Claus, Frosty the 
Snowman, and a red sled to the crèche and menorah, did not 
violate the Establishment Clause. 
 I. 
 Facts and Procedural History 
 Appellees and Cross-Appellants, the American Civil 
Liberties Union of New Jersey ("ACLU") and four residents of 
Jersey City brought this action against Appellants and Cross-
Appellees, the City of Jersey City (the "City"), its mayor and 
its city council.  The ACLU sought to preliminarily and 
permanently enjoin the City from erecting and maintaining a 
holiday display containing a crèche and a menorah on the lawn 
(also known as "City Hall Plaza") in front of its City Hall.  The 
City has displayed the crèche and menorah in City Hall Plaza for 
at least the past thirty years.  Both the crèche and menorah, as 
well as the property on which the displays are located, are owned 
by the City. 
 Jersey City displays its crèche, a representation of 
the Christian nativity scene, on the days immediately preceding 





Jesus was born in a manger in Bethlehem.  The City's display is 
approximately twelve feet long by eight feet wide and includes 
replicas of Joseph, Mary, Jesus, and the Three Wisemen, as well 
as traditional manger imagery such as farm animals and hay.  The 
event depicted by the crèche has particular significance to the 
Christian religion, which worships Jesus as the Son of God and 
the Messiah. 
 Jersey City displays its menorah, a nine-branched 
candelabrum, during the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah.  A menorah is 
used by Jews to commemorate the Miracle of the Oils, a seminal 
event in Jewish history that took place during the rededication 
of the Temple of Jerusalem.  The lighting of the menorah is the 
central ritual of Hanukkah.  As the Supreme Court recognized in 
Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 587 & n.33 (1989), in 
contrast to the Christian celebration of Christmas, Hanukkah is 
not one of the central religious holidays of Judaism. 
 Jersey City customarily displays the menorah on the 
Plaza lawn to the left of the main entrance to City Hall and the 
crèche on the lawn to the right.  Because the Hanukkah festival 
normally overlaps with the Christmas season, the menorah and 
crèche are usually displayed at the same time.  In 1994, however, 
when the present action was initiated, Hanukkah fell unusually 
early on the calendar (November 28 to December 5).  Consequently, 
the City took down the menorah display the day before it erected 
the crèche.  The City also decorated an evergreen tree with 





this tree, the crèche and menorah displays were unaccompanied by 
any other traditional secular symbols of the holiday season.1 
 The ACLU sent a letter to Jersey City Mayor Bret 
Schundler asking the City to reevaluate its practice of 
displaying religious symbols on public property.  In response, 
the City erected a sign adjacent to its display in front of City 
Hall on December 16, 1994, which read:  "Through this display and 
others throughout the year, the City of Jersey City is pleased to 
celebrate the diverse cultural and ethnic heritages of its 
peoples."  Thus, when the ACLU initiated this lawsuit, the Jersey 
City holiday display was comprised of a crèche, a Christmas tree, 
and the sign. 
 On December 21, 1994, the ACLU filed a complaint in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey seeking a declaratory judgment and a 
permanent injunction to prevent the City from displaying a 
menorah and a crèche on the Plaza in front of Jersey City City 
Hall during the winter holiday season.  In their five-count 
complaint, the ACLU alleged violations of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well 
                     
1.   It is unclear whether the district court was aware that the 
1994 display contained the Christmas tree or whether it concluded 
that the tree was too far removed from the crèche and the menorah 
to be considered part of an integrated holiday display.  See 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 11-12.  The Christmas tree is an evergreen tree 
that stands on the City lawn.  During the holiday season, the 
City typically transforms the evergreen into a Christmas tree by 
decorating it with lights and other ornaments.  The district 
court's possible confusion regarding the tree may have been 
caused by the fact that the tree was not visible in the 
photographs of the display that were entered into the record.  
For whatever reason, the district court did not consider the tree 





as three provisions of the New Jersey Constitution.2  The City 
removed the action to federal district court.  On September 19, 
1995, both parties moved for summary judgment. 
 On November 28, 1995, the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey issued an order granting the 
ACLU's motion for summary judgment on counts one and three, 
sustaining their claims based upon the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the 
Religious Preference Clause of the New Jersey Constitution.  ACLU 
of N.J. v. Schundler, No. 95-206, 1995 WL 869972, at *8 (D.N.J. 
Nov. 28, 1995).  The district court entered a permanent 
injunction prohibiting the City from "erecting the crèche and 
menorah display described in the complaint in this action, or any 
substantially similar scene or display at the front entrance of 
the City of Jersey City City Hall or on other property owned, 
maintained, or controlled by the defendants in their official 
capacities."  ACLU of N.J. v. Schundler, No. 95-206 (D.N.J. 
Nov. 28, 1995) (order granting injunction). 
 On December 13, 1995, despite the district court's 
injunction, Jersey City erected its annual holiday display in 
front of City Hall.  The 1995 display consisted of the 
traditional crèche and menorah but also included a four-foot tall 
                     
2.   The five counts are based on alleged violations of the 
following:  (1) the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution; (2) the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) the Religious Preference 
Clause of Article I, Paragraph 4 of the New Jersey Constitution; 
(4) Article I, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution; and 
(5) Article I, Paragraph 5 of the New Jersey Constitution, the 





plastic figure of Santa Claus, a four-foot tall plastic figure of 
Frosty the Snowman, and a red wooden sled.  Frosty and the sled 
were placed on the same side of the Plaza as the crèche, and 
Santa was placed near the menorah and the Christmas tree.  The 
1995 version of the crèche was slightly different from the 1994 
version.  The figures in the crèche were taken out of the manger 
and placed in a circle to one side of the empty manager.  The 
City Hall Plaza Christmas tree was also slightly different, as it 
was decorated with Kwanzaa symbols in addition to the usual 
lights and holiday ribbons.  This modified 1995 display was also 
accompanied by two 20" x 30" signs bearing the City seal and the 
statement:  "Through this display and others throughout the year, 
the City of Jersey City is pleased to celebrate the diverse 
cultural and ethnic heritage of its people." 
 In response to the City's 1995 display, the ACLU 
submitted applications to the district court for both a 
preliminary injunction against further display of the menorah and 
crèche and a judgment that the City was in civil contempt of the 
injunction issued November 28, 1995.  On December 18, 1995, the 
district court issued an order denying the ACLU's request for a 
preliminary injunction and its petition for contempt.  The court 
concluded that the addition of Santa and Frosty, as well as the 
sled and the Kwanzaa symbols, brought the City's display into 
compliance with the Establishment Clause.  The district court 
thus modified its order of November 28, 1995, to require the City 
to maintain the additional secular holiday exhibits (i.e., 





with the Establishment Clause.  ACLU of N.J. v. Schundler, No. 
95-206 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 1995) (order denying preliminary 
injunction).  The district court, in entering the order, stated: 
I conclude that by making these additions defendants 
have sufficiently demystified the [holy], 
they have sufficiently desanctified sacred 
symbols, and they have sufficiently 
deconsecrated the sacred to escape the  
confines of the injunctive order in this 
case. 
Tr. at 12. 
 The City timely filed notices of appeal on December 20, 
1995, from both the November 28 order and injunction, as well as 
the December 18 order modifying that injunction.  The City 
asserts that the district court erred by concluding both that its 
1994 holiday display of a crèche and a menorah was 
unconstitutional and that its 1995 holiday display was 
constitutional as modified.  In other words, the City asserts 
that both its unmodified 1994 display and its modified 1995 
display were in compliance with the Establishment Clause.  On 
January 4, 1996, the ACLU cross-appealed from the December 18, 
1995 order denying their second application for injunctive 
relief.  The ACLU maintains that both displays violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
 II. 
 The Supreme Court's Display Cases 
 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion."  U.S. Const. amend. I.  In the 





v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), the Court 
recognized that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can 
set up a church.  Neither can pass laws which aid all religions, 
or prefer one religion over another."  The Court, paraphrasing 
Thomas Jefferson, stated that the First Amendment "has erected a 
wall between church and state."  Id. 
 The wall-of-separation metaphor, however, overstates 
the actual level of separation of church and state the Court has 
required in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  The Court 
has determined that government may acknowledge the nation's 
religious heritage and that not every law or practice that 
confers a benefit upon religious institutions is 
unconstitutional.  See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973).3 
 We have recognized that the much-maligned test arising 
out of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (the "Lemon test"), 
continues to provide the analytical framework courts must use to 
determine whether a particular practice violates the 
Establishment Clause.  ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Regional 
Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (in banc).  In Black 
Horse Pike, we stated: 
The Lemon test has been the subject of critical debate 
in recent years, and its continuing vitality 
has been called into question by members of 
the Supreme Court and by its noticeable 
absence from the analysis in some of the 
                     
3.   One commentator has noted that the Supreme Court's 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence suggests that "the wall of 
separation is about to resemble the one that divided Berlin -- 
demolished, yet ghostly and evocative."  Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble 





Court's recent decisions (including Lee).  
Nevertheless, Lemon remains the law of the 
land, and we are obligated to consider it 
until instructed otherwise by a majority of 
the Supreme Court. 
Id. at 1484.  The Lemon test is a three-pronged test requiring 
the following:  (1) the statute or government practice must have 
a secular purpose; (2) its practical effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the statute or 
government practice must not foster "an excessive government 
entanglement with religion."  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
 The Supreme Court first applied the Lemon test to a 
government-sponsored holiday religious display in Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).  In Lynch, a 5-4 decision, the 
Court upheld the constitutional validity of a winter holiday 
display maintained by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island.  The 
display was situated in a private park.  The display itself was 
owned by the city and included a crèche, a wishing well, a Santa 
Claus house (with a live Santa), a Christmas tree, reindeer 
pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a "Seasons 
Greetings" banner, hundreds of colored lights, live carolers, and 
cutout figures of a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear.  Id. at 
671.  The Court, applying the Lemon test, found that:  (1) the 
display, because it contained secular as well as religious 
symbols, had the legitimate secular purpose of recognizing and 
celebrating a national holiday; (2) the crèche did no more to 
advance or inhibit religion than the myriad government benefits 





and (3) there was no evidence of administrative entanglement of 
religion.  Id. at 680-85. 
 Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch focused 
primarily on the second prong of the Lemon test.  She styled her 
approach as an "endorsement test," which stated that 
"[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community."  Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring).  The context of the particular government practice 
was at the core of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test.  She 
stated: 
Every government practice must be judged in its unique 
circumstances to determine whether it 
constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of 
religion.  In making that determination, 
courts must keep in mind both the fundamental 
place held by the Establishment Clause in our 
constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle 
ways in which Establishment Clause values can 
be eroded.  Government practices that purport 
to celebrate or acknowledge events with 
religious significance must be subjected to 
careful judicial scrutiny. 
Id. at 694 (emphasis added). 
 In Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), the 
Supreme Court again considered the constitutionality of a  
holiday display.  Allegheny County involved two different 
displays.  The first display was a crèche located on the Grand 
Staircase of the Allegheny County, Pennsylvania Courthouse.  Id. 
at 580.  The second display was a menorah placed next to a 





located just outside the Pittsburgh City-County Building.  Id. at 
582.  The crèche display was surrounded by a fence and a 
poinsettia floral frame and included small evergreen trees but 
did not include traditional secular holiday figures.  The crèche 
had at its crest an angel bearing a banner that proclaimed 
"Gloria in Excelsis Deo," which translates to "Glory to God in 
the highest."  Id. at 580 & n.5.  The menorah, on the other hand, 
was placed next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty. 
 The Court's decision in Allegheny County spawned 
several opinions and two different holdings.  A 5-4 majority held 
that the display of the crèche in the county courthouse violated 
the Establishment Clause.  A 6-3 majority upheld the 
constitutional validity of the display of a menorah next to a 
Christmas tree outside the City-County Building.4 
 Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Blackmun 
discussed the Court's move away from Lemon toward a "refined 
. . . definition of governmental action that unconstitutionally 
advances religion."  Id. at 592.  Focusing on the word 
"endorsement" put forth by Justice O'Connor's concurrence in 
Lynch, Justice Blackmun concluded that: 
The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits 
government from appearing to take a position 
on questions of religious belief or from 
"making adherence to a religion relevant in 
any way to a person's standing in the 
political community." 
                     
4.   In Allegheny County, the ACLU specifically challenged the 





Id. at 594 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
 Justices Blackmun and O'Connor represented the swing 
votes.  Both Justices voted to allow the menorah and the 
Christmas tree display and to disallow the crèche display.  To 
pinpoint the Court's reasoning in permitting the menorah and 
Christmas tree display while condemning the crèche display, we 
must analyze the rationale of the swing votes. 
 Justice Blackmun began his opinion (writing for the 
majority) by recognizing that the crèche display at issue in the 
case conveyed "praise to God in Christian terms [which] is 
indisputably religious -- indeed sectarian -- just as it is when 
said in the Gospel or in a church service."  Id. at 598.  Justice 
Blackmun then distinguished Lynch, flatly rejecting the notion 
that Lynch rendered crèche displays per se constitutionally 
permissible.  On the contrary, Justice Blackmun emphasized that 
nothing in the context of the display at issue detracted from the 
crèche's religious message.  In addition, Justice Blackmun 
recognized that the crèche sat on the Grand Staircase in the 
courthouse, which was "the main and most beautiful part of the 
building that is the seat of county government."  Id. at 599.  As 
such, 
[n]o viewer could reasonably think that it occupies 
this location without the support and 
approval of the government.  Thus, by 
permitting the "display of the crèche in this 
particular physical setting," Lynch, 465 U.S. 
at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring), the county 
sends an unmistakable message that it 
supports and promotes the Christian praise to 





Id. at 601.  Thus, given the content and context of the crèche 
display, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority of the Court, 
concluded that: 
Lynch teaches that government may celebrate Christmas 
in some manner and form, but not in a way 
that endorses Christian doctrine.  Here, 
Allegheny County has transgressed this line. 
 It has chosen to celebrate Christmas in a 
way that has the effect of endorsing a 
patently Christian message:  Glory to God for 
the birth of Jesus Christ.  Under Lynch, and 
the rest of our cases, nothing more is 
required to demonstrate a violation of the 
Establishment Clause. 
Id. at 602. 
 Later in his opinion Justice Blackmun, no longer 
writing for a majority of the Court, presented the reasons why he 
voted to allow the menorah and Christmas tree display.  Justice 
Blackmun recognized that government celebration of Christmas and 
Hanukkah as religious holidays would violate the Establishment 
Clause,5 but concluded that Allegheny County's display of a 
Christmas tree and a menorah "recognizes that both Christmas and 
Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season, which has 
attained a secular status in our society."  Id. at 616.  His 
conclusion was based largely on the fact that he considered the 
Christmas tree to be a secular symbol due to the fact that "many 
Americans place Christmas trees in their homes without 
subscribing to Christian religious beliefs."  Id. at 616-17.  
Justice Blackmun also relied heavily on the spatial context of 
the display, commenting that: 
                     
5.   In this discussion, Justice Blackmun stated that "[t]he 
display of a menorah next to a crèche on government property 





The tree, moreover, is clearly the predominant element 
in the city's display.  The 45-foot tree 
occupies the central position beneath the 
middle archway in front of the Grant Street 
entrance to the City-County Building; the 18-
foot menorah is positioned to one side.  
Given this configuration, it is much more 
sensible to interpret the meaning of the 
menorah in light of the tree, rather than 
vice versa.  In the shadow of the tree, the 
menorah is readily understood as simply a 
recognition that Christmas is not the only 
traditional way of observing the winter-
holiday season. 
Id. at 617. 
 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor also focused on 
the question of endorsement.  Reviving the endorsement test she 
formulated in her concurrence in Lynch, Justice O'Connor 
presented the reasons for treating the crèche in Lynch 
differently from the crèche in Allegheny County: 
In Lynch, I concluded that the city's display of a 
crèche in its larger holiday exhibit in a 
private park in the commercial district had 
neither the purpose nor the effect of 
conveying a message of government endorsement 
of Christianity or disapproval of other 
religions.  The purpose of including the 
crèche in the larger display was to celebrate 
the public holiday through its traditional 
symbols, not to promote the religious content 
of the crèche.  Nor, in my view, did 
Pawtucket's display of the crèche along with 
secular symbols of the Christmas holiday 
objectively convey a message of endorsement 
of Christianity. 
 
. . .  I agree that the crèche displayed on the Grand 
Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse, 
the seat of county government, conveys a 
message to nonadherents of Christianity that 
they are not full members of the political 
community, and a corresponding message to 
Christians that they are favored members of 
the political community.  In contrast to the 
crèche in Lynch, which was displayed in a 
private park in the city's commercial 





traditional secular symbols of the holiday 
season, this crèche stands alone in the 
county courthouse.  The display of religious 
symbols in public areas of core government 
buildings runs a special risk of making 
religion relevant, in reality or public 
perception, to status in the political 
community. 
Id. at 626 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Blackmun that the 
menorah and Christmas tree display was constitutionally 
permissible for "reasons which differ somewhat."  Id. at 632.  
Justice O'Connor, like Justice Blackmun, concluded that a 
Christmas tree was a secular object but disagreed that the 
menorah was largely secular in the context of the display.  She 
viewed the menorah as "the central religious symbol and religious 
object" of Hanukkah.  Id. at 633.  The question for her, 
therefore, was whether "the Christmas tree is a predominantly 
secular symbol and, more significantly, [whether it] obscures the 
religious nature of the menorah and the holiday of Hanukkah."  
Id.  In answering this question, Justice O'Connor concluded: 
By accompanying its display of a Christmas tree -- a 
secular symbol of the Christmas holiday 
season -- with a salute to liberty, and by 
adding a religious symbol from a Jewish 
holiday also celebrated at roughly the same 
time of the year, I conclude that the city 
did not endorse Judaism or religion in 
general, but rather conveyed a message of 
pluralism and freedom of belief during the 
holiday season.  Although the religious and 
indeed sectarian significance of the menorah 
is not neutralized by the setting, this 
particular physical setting changes what 
viewers may fairly understand to be the 
purpose of the display -- as a typical museum 
setting, though not neutralizing the 





negates any message of endorsement of that 
content. 
Id. at 635 (citations omitted). 
 The Supreme Court revisited the Establishment Clause 
recently in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 
___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995).  Again, 
the Court produced several opinions purporting to present the 
"correct" Establishment Clause analysis.  Capitol Square is 
instructive to our analysis because, although it involves private 
religious expression in a traditional open forum, the Court 
indicated that it will likely apply an endorsement-test approach 
to determine the constitutionality of a public religious display. 
 In Capitol Square, the Court held that Ohio's denial of 
the Ku Klux Klan's application to display an unattended cross on 
the statehouse square could not be justified on the ground that 
granting a permit would have violated the Establishment Clause.  
Justice Scalia wrote for a 7-2 majority of the Court.  Id. at 
2447.  A second portion of Justice Scalia's opinion, in which he 
rejected the application of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test 
to the privately-sponsored cross display, was a plurality opinion 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and 
Thomas.  Id. at 2447-48.  Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices 
Souter and Brennan, wrote separately to apply the endorsement 
test but concluded that a reasonable observer would not attribute 
the religious message conveyed by the cross to the State.  Id. at 
2451.  Justice Stevens dissented, concluding that a reasonable 





religious character before a seat of government would convey a 
message of state sponsorship.  Id. at 2464.  Justice Ginsburg 
also dissented, determining that the display of the cross would 
have carried a message of endorsement by the State.  Id. at 2474. 
 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, 
distinguished Allegheny County and Lynch by stating: 
In Allegheny County we held that the display of a 
privately-sponsored crèche on the "Grand 
Staircase" of the Allegheny County Courthouse 
violated the Establishment Clause.  That 
staircase was not, however, open to all on an 
equal basis, so the County was favoring 
sectarian religious expression.  We expressly 
distinguished that site from the kind of 
public forum at issue here, and made clear 
that if the staircase were available to all 
on the same terms, "the presence of the 
crèche in that location for over six weeks 
would then not serve to associate the 
government with the crèche."  In Lynch we 
held that a city's display of a crèche did 
not violate the Establishment Clause because, 
in context, the display did not endorse 
religion.  The opinion does assume . . . that 
the government's use of religious symbols is 
unconstitutional if it effectively endorses 
sectarian religious belief.  But the case 
neither holds nor even remotely assumes that 
the government's neutral treatment of private 
religious expression can be unconstitutional. 
Id. at 2448 (citations omitted). 
 Although the plurality refused to apply the endorsement 
test to the privately-sponsored cross display in Capitol Square, 
it acknowledged that the endorsement test would be properly 
employed to test the constitutionality of government speech.  Id. 
at 2448-49.  Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia noted, 
"[w]here we have tested for endorsement of religion, the subject 





. . . ."  Id. at 2447 (citation omitted).  Thus, Capitol Square 
indicates that at least a majority of the Court would apply an 
endorsement test to determine the constitutionality of a 
government-sponsored religious display on government property. 
 In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Allegheny 
County and Capitol Square, we conclude that the endorsement test 
is the proper analysis to apply to Jersey City's display of 
religious symbols on city property.6  Under the facts of this 
case, we need not reach the question debated by the members of 
the Court in Capitol Square of whether the endorsement test 
should be limited in application to government speech, because 
the religious symbols at issue here are owned and displayed by 
the city government on city government property.7 
                     
6.   Again, it is not our intention to depart from this Court's 
recent pronouncement in ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike 
Regional Board of Education, 84 F.3d 1471, 1484 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(in banc), that "Lemon remains the law of the land" as the 
governing test for Establishment Clause cases.  Rather, we merely 
reiterate that in Establishment Clause challenges to religious 
displays, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the endorsement 
test -- a refinement of the "effects" prong of Lemon -- should be 
the focus of our analysis. 
7.   We do not mean to imply, however, that a display identical 
to the one presented by Jersey City (if privately sponsored) 
would necessarily withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Rather, we 
merely point out that the display at issue here does not fall 
within the so-called exception to the endorsement test put forth 
by the plurality in Capitol Square.  See Capitol Square, 115 S. 






 The Original Display 
  A. Government Erection of a Crèche 
 Under the endorsement test, a display violates the 
Establishment Clause if, in its particular setting, the display 
is "sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the 
controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by non-adherents 
as a disapproval of their individual religious choices."  
Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 597.  In applying the endorsement 
test to Jersey City's display, we must consider the particular 
effects of its display of a crèche. 
 One of the principles that emerges from the shifting 
pluralities of Allegheny County is that government erection of a 
crèche creates an inherent risk of perceived endorsement.  The 
crèche, which depicts the event that lies at the very core of 
Christianity, is an unambiguous religious symbol.8  Indeed, 
Justice O'Connor in Allegheny County recognized that a crèche is 
"the central religious symbol of the Christmas holiday."  Id. at 
627. 
 A crèche represents the Christian belief that Jesus was 
born to the Virgin Mary to lead humankind on a path toward 
salvation and redemption. Yet Jersey City would have us believe 
that the symbol of the crèche has achieved such a level of 
                     
8.   One commentator suggests that the Supreme Court's decisions 
in the display cases are guided by their view of the messages 
conveyed by particular religious symbols and whether these 
symbols are "pure" or "ambiguous."  Calvin R. Massey, Pure 






secular status that it is religiously benign.  We are not so 
persuaded.  The mere fact that a religious symbol is pervasively 
displayed during the holiday season does not diminish its 
religious significance.  A crèche unambiguously represents a 
belief that is not universally shared by the citizens of this 
country.  In fact, many citizens believe that Jesus may only be 
understood as a Hebrew prophet.  For some devout observers of 
their respective faiths, it is heresy to ascribe a divine 
character or purpose to Jesus' life or death.  Indeed, as Justice 
Brennan recognized in his dissent in Lynch, "[F]or Christians, 
that path [toward salvation and redemption] is exclusive, 
precious, and holy.  But for those who do not share these 
beliefs, the symbolic reenactment of the birth of a divine being 
who has been miraculously incarnated as a man stands as a 
dramatic reminder of their differences with Christian faith."  
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 708 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 When government chooses to speak by erecting a crèche 
on government property, the principles at the core of the 
Establishment Clause are clearly implicated.  See Capitol Square, 
115 S. Ct. at 2448 ("In Allegheny County, we held that the 
display of a privately-sponsored crèche on the `Grand Staircase' 
of the Allegheny County Courthouse violated the Establishment 
Clause.  That staircase was not, however, open to all on an equal 
basis, so the County was favoring sectarian religious 
expression.").  By erecting a crèche itself, on city property, a 
city sends a stronger message of endorsement of religion than 





the former context, the government is effectively conveying the 
message that "we celebrate the holiday season by recognizing the 
birth of Christ."  As Justice O'Connor noted in Allegheny County, 
"[T]he display of religious symbols in public areas of core 
government buildings runs a special risk of making religion 
relevant, in reality or in public perception, to status in the 
political community."  Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 626 
(O'Connor, J., concurring).  Accordingly, we conclude that Jersey 
City's display of a crèche on City Hall Plaza -- the very seat of 
Jersey City government -- conveyed a message of religious 
endorsement. 
 Further, we note that the expenditure of public funds 
to erect and maintain a religious display directly implicates the 
Establishment Clause.  Jersey City's display was erected and 
maintained with public funds.  If a city taxpayer objected to the 
religious display, he or she could not have opted out of 
contribution to the display, even if fundamentally repugnant to 
his or her own beliefs.  Of course, taxpayers often exercise 
little control over how the government spends its money on a 
daily basis, but the Establishment Clause presents unique 
constraints on the expenditure of public funds for religious 
purposes.9  Most importantly, the Establishment Clause requires 
the government to remain neutral towards religion in its 
expenditure of public funds. 
                     
9.   In recognition of these constraints, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged taxpayer standing in the Establishment Clause 
context, while rejecting taxpayer standing in others.  See Flast 





 Here, Jersey City expressed a religious preference by 
erecting a religious display through the expenditure of taxpayer 
dollars.10  Moreover, by using taxpayer dollars to fund a display 
containing religious symbols, Jersey City has increased the risk 
that the display's religious message will be attributed to the 
city and its taxpayers.  In other words, Jersey City's use of 
public funds to erect and maintain its display increased the 
"risk of making religion relevant . . . to status in [Jersey 
City's] political community."  Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 626 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
 Jersey City's display of a crèche was accompanied by a 
menorah, a sign, and a Christmas Tree.  Jersey City maintains 
that this context alters the message of endorsement conveyed by 
the display of the crèche.  We disagree.  The menorah is a 
religious symbol.  And when displayed with a crèche, the 
menorah's religious significance is emphasized.  Moreover, the 
token inclusion of the Christmas tree does little to mitigate the 
religious message of the crèche and the menorah.  Thus, the 
display cannot be viewed as anything but a constitutionally 
impermissible dual endorsement of Christianity and Judaism. 
 Read together, Lynch, Allegheny County, and Capitol 
Square emphasize the importance of perceived government 
endorsement of religion in Establishment Clause analysis.  A 
                     
10.   For an interesting discussion of the Establishment Clause 
implications of using taxpayer dollars to fund religious 
displays, see generally Jesse H. Choper, Securing Religious 






comparison of Jersey City's display with the displays involved in 
Allegheny County and Lynch reinforces the conclusion that Jersey 
City's original display impermissibly endorsed religion.  In 
Allegheny County, a privately-owned nativity scene was displayed 
on the main staircase of the county courthouse, bounded by a 
wooden fence, poinsettias, and a plaque stating "This Display 
Donated by the Holy Name Society."  Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 
580.  Thus, even with a sign proclaiming private ownership of the 
display, the Court held that the display, in its context (on the 
grand staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse), communicated 
state endorsement of religion.  In Lynch, the government-owned 
and maintained crèche was part of a "winter wonderland" display 
and was situated in a privately-owned park not located near any 
visible seat of government.  Because there were no external 
indicia of government sponsorship of the crèche, the risk of 
perceived endorsement was significantly lessened.  And in Capitol 
Square, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the display of 
a privately-sponsored cross in a public square because the 
government was not "sponsoring" the speech. 
 In this case,  Jersey City not only owned and 
maintained the crèche but chose to erect it on City Hall Plaza -- 
the very seat of Jersey City government.  Moreover, the sign that 
accompanied the display proudly proclaimed that the display was 
sponsored by Jersey City.  Like the crèche in Allegheny County, 
the crèche and the menorah were located prominently at the 
visible seat of government power.  The City placed the display 





prominent religious symbols.  The Establishment Clause prohibits 
the government, when speaking, from expressing favoritism towards 
a particular religion.  By using the City Hall Plaza as a forum 
from which to communicate its endorsement of Christianity and 
Judaism, Jersey City violated the Establishment Clause.11 
 B. The City's Diversity/Pluralism Justification 
 The City maintains that its celebration of many 
different religions throughout the year should be considered the 
"context" in which the crèche and the menorah should be viewed, 
effectively converting its religious displays from "endorsement 
of religion" into a "celebration of diversity." 
 There are three reasons why the City's 
diversity/pluralism justification fails to pass constitutional 
muster.  First, notwithstanding Justice O'Connor's recognition of 
the values of religious pluralism in Allegheny County, government 
endorsement of one or any number of different religions is 
unconstitutional.  Second, a reasonable observer cannot be 
presumed to be aware of the various religious and cultural 
celebrations that take place throughout the year in Jersey City. 
 Third, the City's policy of celebrating many different 
religions, while perhaps laudable, is a classic example of 
                     
11.   The ACLU also challenged the constitutionality of the 
display under the New Jersey Constitution.  In interpreting the 
New Jersey Establishment Clause, New Jersey courts have relied on 
Federal Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  See Ran-Dav's County 
Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1358 (N.J. 1992).  Thus, we 
need not consider separately whether the displays are consistent 





government entanglement with religion.  We will discuss each of 
these points in detail below. 
 (1) Endorsement of More Than One Religion 
 The City, in support of its diversity/pluralism 
justification, relies on the following language from Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence in Allegheny County: 
By accompanying its display of a Christmas tree -- a 
secular symbol of the Christmas holiday 
season -- with a salute to liberty, and by 
adding a religious symbol from a Jewish 
holiday also celebrated at roughly the same 
time of the year, I conclude that the city 
did not endorse Judaism or religion in 
general, but rather conveyed a message of 
pluralism and freedom of belief during the 
holiday season. 
 
 * * * 
 
A reasonable observer would, in my view, appreciate 
that the combined display is an effort to 
acknowledge the cultural diversity of our 
country and to convey tolerance of different 
choices in matters of religious belief or 
nonbelief by recognizing that the winter 
holiday season is celebrated in diverse ways 
by our citizens.  In short, in the holiday 
context, this combined display in its 
particular physical setting conveys neither 
an endorsement of Judaism or Christianity nor 
disapproval of alternative beliefs, and thus 
does not have the impermissible effect of 
"mak[ing] religion relevant, in reality or 
public perception, to status in the political 
community." 
Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 635-36 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 
692 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).  The City maintains that 
Allegheny County stands for the proposition that government 
celebration of different religions is not in fact "endorsement" 





 The City misreads Justice O'Connor's emphasis on 
pluralism and diversity.  The menorah in Allegheny County, while 
viewed by Justice O'Connor as a religious symbol, was placed next 
to a Christmas Tree, which the Court (including Justice O'Connor) 
considered a secular symbol.  Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded 
that the display, in context, endorsed neither Judaism or 
Christianity.  The secular nature of the Christmas tree, 
concluded Justice O'Connor, converted the display into a 
celebration of diversity and pluralism and distinguished it from 
an endorsement of religion. 
 But it is important to note that Justice O'Connor's 
pluralism/diversity justification for the menorah and Christmas 
tree display in Allegheny County was not based on the fact that 
two different religions were represented in a display.  She 
emphasized that the Christmas tree created a secular context 
emphasizing diversity and pluralism.  It remains clear that 
government celebration of one particular religion, or even more 
than one religion, can constitute government endorsement of 
religion that violates the Establishment Clause by "sending a 
clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or less 
than full members of the political community."  Allegheny County, 
492 U.S. at 627 (O'Connor, J., concurring).  We do not suggest 
that all government celebrations of diverse cultures need be free 
of all religious content.  Indeed, such celebrations would likely 
be impossible given religion's inherent role in many different 
cultures.  We merely recognize that government celebration of 





endorsement of religion into a secular "celebration of diversity 
and pluralism." 
 (2) The Perspective of the "Reasonable Observer" 
 The City argues that the reasonable, informed observer 
of the original Jersey City display should be presumed to be 
aware of the City's year-round celebration of different cultures 
and religions.  According to the City, it should be apparent to 
such an informed observer that the display is a celebration of 
culture and not an endorsement of religion. 
 In discerning here the viewpoint of the "reasonable 
observer" we are asked to consider whether the observer is aware 
of the "history and context" of the challenged government 
activity.12  Justice O'Connor, for one, has not hesitated to 
impute a significant amount of knowledge of "history and context" 
                     
12.   Although we agree with the City that the endorsement test 
necessarily focuses on the perception of some formulation of a 
"reasonable observer," we note the nearly impossible task of 
giving content to the hypothetical reasonable observer in our 
multicultural society.  In his dissent in Allegheny County, 
Justice Brennan identified the risk of subjective construction of 
the viewpoint of the "reasonable observer": 
 
 I shudder to think that the only "reasonable 
observer" is one who shares the particular 
views on perspective, spacing, and accent 
expressed in Justice Blackmun's opinion, thus 
making analysis under the Establishment 
Clause look more like an exam in Art 101 than 
an inquiry into constitutional law. 
 
Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 
 Indeed, in Capitol Square the concurring and dissenting 
Justices struggled over the definition of "reasonable observer," 
disagreeing over just how informed a reasonable observer needed 
to be.  See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares and 
Voucher Payments: Problems of Government Neutrality, 28 Conn. L. 





to the reasonable observer.  See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 
2455 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 
76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
 Justice Stevens, in contrast, has rejected Justice 
O'Connor's "ideal" reasonable observer, finding her conception to 
be more akin to a "well-schooled jurist" than a mere reasonable 
observer.  Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2466 n.5 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Explicitly rejecting the assumption that reasonable 
viewers are aware of the history of the public forum at issue, 
Justice Stevens noted that Justice O'Connor "apparently would not 
extend Establishment Clause protection to passers by who are 
unaware of Capitol Square's history."  Id. at 2470 n.14. 
 Moreover, several courts of appeal have refused to 
allow the "history and context" of a practice to trump an 
otherwise clear endorsement of religion that would be apparent to 
a so-called reasonable observer.  See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 
68 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[A]n appeal to history 
. . . is indeed an argument which could always `trump' the 
Establishment Clause, because of the undeniable significance of 
religion and religious symbols in the history of many of our 
communities."); Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1525-26 
(9th Cir. 1993) (refusing to consider the "historical 
significance" of a municipality's display of a cross in a city 
park); Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1415 (7th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1229 (1992) (striking a city seal 





history can abate [a sectarian] message when the images in the 
seal are abstract symbols of a particular Christian sect"). 
 We agree with Justice Stevens that assuming the 
reasonable observer is aware of "history and context" when 
viewing a municipality's religious display is "a highly unlikely 
supposition."  Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2470 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  In our view, when testing for endorsement, we must 
take into account the perspective of those citizens within the 
community who hold minority religious views.13 
 Thus, we cannot agree that an observer of the display 
who is a new resident to Jersey City, has no understanding of the 
history of the community, but has a strong sense of his or her 
own faith, a faith not depicted in the display, is somehow less 
"reasonable" an observer than the Christian or Jewish observer 
who has lived in Jersey City for twenty years.  It follows that 
this new resident of Jersey City should be entitled to no less 
Establishment Clause protection than a long-time resident. 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the reasonable observer 
of Jersey City's display cannot be presumed to have knowledge of 
Jersey City's different cultural and religious celebrations.  The 
City argues that the "reasonable observer" sees a "time lapse 
photograph" depicting Jersey City's various celebrations.  This 
is a view that departs from reality.  A reasonable observer of 
                     
13.   For further discussion of this point, see Kent Greenawalt, 
Quo Vadis:  The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the 
Religion Clauses, 8 Sup. Ct. Rev. 323, 374 (1995) (noting that 
the reasonable observer "should have only an ordinary amount of 






Jersey City's display stands before City Hall, flanked by two 
religious symbols:  the crèche and the menorah.  There are no 
other visual components, other than the sign proclaiming the 
City's celebration of diversity, that can give the observer the 
"time-lapse photograph" effect.14  A general awareness of the 
City's celebration of diversity throughout the year is obscured 
by the physical presence of the symbols of Christianity and 
Judaism before City Hall. 
 (3) Entanglement 
 The City also argues that its erection of the crèche 
and the menorah are part of an overall plan to celebrate 
different religions and cultures.  This argument must also fail. 
 Put simply, Jersey City has pursued a quintessential type of 
government action that "fosters an excessive entanglement with 
religion."  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 430 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). 
 In Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), the Court 
reaffirmed the continuing vitality of the "excessive 
entanglement" prong of the Lemon test.  Aguilar involved a 
challenge to New York City's provision of funding for public 
                     
14.   Counsel for the City rely heavily on the "secularizing" 
power of the sign accompanying the display.  Again, the sign 
read, "[t]hrough this display and others throughout the year, the 
City of Jersey City is pleased to celebrate the diverse cultural 
and ethnic heritages of its peoples."  See City Br. 17; City 
Reply Br. 11; Oral Arg. Tr. 20, 22, 58, 63, 66.  The Supreme 
Court has recognized, however, that "no sign can disclaim an 
overwhelming message of endorsement."  Allegheny County, 492 U.S. 
at 619.  We conclude, therefore, that the sign cannot 
"secularize" the display, or dilute its message of endorsement, 
merely because it conveys to the reasonable observer that the 






school instructors who taught remedial classes to private school 
students in private school classrooms.  An overwhelming majority 
of the participating private schools were religiously affiliated. 
 New York City adopted a supervisory system designed to monitor 
the classes to ensure that public funds were not used to 
inculcate religious beliefs.  In holding that New York City's 
program violated the Establishment Clause, the Court stated: 
This pervasive monitoring by public authorities in the 
sectarian schools infringes precisely those 
Establishment Clause values at the root of 
the prohibition of excessive entanglement.  
Agents of the city must visit and inspect the 
religious school regularly, alert for the 
subtle or overt presence of religious matter 
in Title I classes.  In addition, the 
religious school must obey these same agents 
when they make determinations as to what is 
and what is not a "religious symbol" and thus 
off limits in a Title I classroom.  In short, 
the religious school, which has a primary 
purpose of the advancement and preservation 
of a particular religion must endure the 
ongoing presence of state personnel whose 
primary purpose is to monitor teachers and 
students in an attempt to guard against the 
infiltration of religious thought. 
Id. at 413 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 Even if we were to conclude that the City could avoid 
the "endorsement" of religion by implementing its plan to 
celebrate many different religions and cultures, it could not 
avoid an excessive entanglement with religion in the 
implementation.  Such a plan would necessitate judgments 
regarding which religious and cultural holidays to celebrate, 
which religious and cultural symbols appropriately conveyed the 
proper non-sectarian message, and decisions regarding the 





religions.  In carrying out this plan, Jersey City Mayor 
Schundler would have to address significant questions regarding 
specific religions:  Should a rabbi and a priest be consulted 
when erecting the menorah and the crèche?  Should a ceremony 
accompany the erection of these religious symbols?  Should the 
City employ a Muslim cleric during Ramadan Observance Month to 
avoid offending a theological protocol of Islam?15 
 Another troubling aspect of entanglement pinpointed by 
the Court in Aguilar is the very proper and legitimate concern 
that governmental involvement in such decisions will alienate 
certain members of the political community.  The Court commented 
that: 
The numerous judgments that must be made by agents of 
the city concern matters that may be subtle 
and controversial, yet may be of deep 
religious significance to the controlling 
denominations.  As government agents must 
make these judgments, the dangers of 
political divisiveness along religious lines 
increase. 
Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414. 
                     
15.   Our analysis does not require consideration of the motives 
of Mayor Schundler himself.  Our concern runs deeper and is 
focused on the dangers associated with placing the power to make 
religious judgments in the hands of government officials.  On 
this point, we remain guided by Justice Black, who wrote: 
 
 The Establishment Clause thus stands as an 
expression of the principle on the part of 
the Founders of our Constitution that 
religion is too personal, too sacred, too 
holy, to permit its "unhallowed perversion" 
by a civil magistrate. 
 





 Jersey City, in implementing its plan to celebrate the 
diversity and pluralism of various religions and cultures, would 
obviously encounter the types of decisions that would produce 
political divisiveness.  Many adherents of religions other than 
Christianity and Judaism would likely feel politically alienated 
if the City were unwilling to erect a display commemorating their 
particular religion.  Moreover, the City's continuing role in 
deciding how to celebrate various religions will be, in reality, 
inevitably guided by politics.  For example, it would be unlikely 
that Mayor Schundler (or any other head of a municipality) would 
erect a display that would offend a majority of his 
constituents.16  That such a political calculation is possible 
confirms that these types of religious judgments should not be 
placed in the hands of an elected official. 
 Thus, we conclude that the City's plan to celebrate 
many different religions and cultures would amount to a 
constitutionally impermissible entanglement of government and 
religion. 
 IV. 
 The Second Display (adding Santa, Frosty, and the Red Sled) 
 The district court, in its December 21, 1995 order, 
permitted Jersey City's display of a crèche, a menorah, Frosty 
                     
16.   Justice Powell identified this as a concern in his 
concurrence in Aguilar, commenting that "[i]n States . . . that 
have large and varied sectarian populations, one can be assured 
that politics will enter into any state decision to aid parochial 





the Snowman, Santa, and a red sled.  As we noted earlier, the 
district court stated: 
I conclude that by making these additions defendants 
have sufficiently demystified the [holy], 
they have sufficiently desanctified sacred 
symbols, and they have sufficiently 
deconsecrated the sacred to escape the 
confines of the injunctive order in this 
case. 
Tr. at 12.  The district court modified its November 28 order by 
requiring Jersey City to maintain the additional secular figures 
(Frosty and Santa) in the display.  If Frosty, Santa, and/or the 
sled were stolen or destroyed, they were to be replaced within 
twenty-four hours. 
 Without opinion, the district court apparently 
determined that the presence of Frosty, Santa, and a sled 
cleansed the display of its sectarian qualities.  In so holding, 
the district court summarily concluded that the modified display 
was constitutional under Lynch and Allegheny County.  ACLU of 
N.J. v. Schundler, No. 95-206 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 1995) (order 
denying preliminary injunction). 
 This summary conclusion is particularly troubling given 
the Supreme Court's emphasis in Lynch and Allegheny County on the 
importance of analyzing the specific context of the challenged 
display.  The district court offered no assessment of the 
demystifying powers of Frosty the Snowman or Santa Claus, or even 
the sled.  That is, the court did not explain how the context of 
the second display "demystified" the impermissible religious 
content (the crèche and menorah) of the original display.  





"demystification" (or "desanctification") analysis.  Under 
Allegheny County, the relevant analysis focuses on whether the 
content and context of the display would convey a message of 
government endorsement of religion.  While true that the Court in 
Allegheny County found the menorah and Christmas tree display to 
convey a secular message, the Court has never suggested that the 
demystification powers of certain secular figures could diminish 
the religious message conveyed by sectarian symbols.17  As such, 
we conclude that the district court erred in determining that the 
constitutionality of the modified display depended on whether the 
presence of Frosty and Santa "demystified" the crèche and the 
menorah.18 
 We also note that, in our view, Allegheny County does 
not compel the result reached by the district court.  Allegheny 
County did not create a per se rule that a "secular" symbol 
placed next to a "religious" symbol is constitutional.  The 
content of the Allegheny County display was arguably secular.  
While Justice O'Connor recognized that the menorah is a religious 
                     
17.   If adopted, the district court's "demystification" approach 
would lead federal courts and municipal officials to engage in an 
ad hoc, arbitrary, constitutional guessing game over the relative 
secularizing "power" of individual symbols.  For example, a city 
mayor would be forced to decide whether the addition of a plastic 
candy cane would be enough to bring a crèche display in 
compliance with the Establishment Clause, or whether he or she 
would also need to add a string of lights.  As a practical 
matter, we find it unlikely that these difficult questions of 
constitutional magnitude can be solved by a plastic Santa or 
Frosty. 
18.   We note that both the ACLU and the City agree that the 
district court's "demystification" approach was flawed.  ACLU Br. 





symbol, she also recognized that a depiction of a Christmas tree 
and a menorah may invoke an image of different individuals 
celebrating the holidays at the end of the calendar year.  
Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).  
This time of year is, at least in this country, widely regarded 
as "the holiday season."  Thus, Justice O'Connor recognized that 
a Christmas tree and a menorah, in the context they were 
presented in Allegheny County, endorsed only a secular 
recognition of the holiday season.  Id. at 635-36.   
 Government display of a crèche, on the other hand, 
cannot convey a meaning separate from the very act it is meant to 
portray.  A crèche depicts the Birth of Christ, the event that 
lies at the foundation of Christianity.  In Allegheny County, the 
Court determined that displays containing a crèche as a primary 
focal point, which are situated at the seat of government, are 
constitutionally impermissible as they convey a message of 
government endorsement.  This is consistent with Lynch, in which 
the Court permitted a crèche that was part of a display in a 
private park depicting a "winter wonderland" scene because, in 
context, there were no external indicia of government 
endorsement. 
 As we have discussed, the Supreme Court, in its myriad 
of approaches in the display cases, has repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of examining the context of the display at issue to 
determine whether it has the effect of endorsing religion.  In 
ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of 





"the importance of the context of a challenged practice" in 
conducting an Establishment Clause analysis.  ACLU of N.J. v. 
Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1484 (3d Cir. 
1996).  The context of Jersey City's second display is as 
follows:  on one side, a large menorah stands about ten feet from 
a four-foot plastic Santa and a Christmas tree decorated with 
lights and Kwanzaa symbols; on the other side, the characters of 
the crèche are huddled off to the side of a manger, with Frosty 
in the background bearing witness and separated from the crèche 
by a red sled.  The token additions of the secular symbols do 
little to alter the "context" or the focal points of the City's 
display.  We reiterate that Jersey City's display of the crèche 
at the seat of City government power impermissibly conveyed a 
message of government endorsement of religion.  And, in our view, 
the City's addition of Santa, Frosty, and a red sled did little 
to secularize that message.19 
                     
19.   The ACLU, in its brief, artfully addresses the district 
court's Establishment Clause analysis by stating that: 
 
 [A]t most, a reasonable observer would construe 
[Frosty and Santa] to be background witnesses 
to the Miracle of the Oils and the Birth of 
Christ, respectively.  However confusing the 
presence of a snowman in Bethlehem may be 
from a canonical perspective, a reasonable 
observer informed of the history and context 
of religious displays in front of City Hall 
would invariably characterize them for what 
they  
 
 are - attempts at evasion of constitutional prohibitions 
through superficial secular tokenism. 





 The difficulty presented by the district court's 
hypertechnical Establishment Clause analysis is exacerbated by 
its requirement in the injunction that Santa, Frosty, and the 
sled were to be replaced within twenty-four hours if any of them 
were removed from the display.  Apparently, the district court 
found the constitutional "demystification" powers of Frosty, 
Santa, and the sled to be so great that their absence for one day 
would transform the display back into a government endorsement of 
religion.  This reinforces the plain fact that the district court 
was convinced that the presence of two, four-foot plastic 
figurines of Frosty and Santa, along with a red wooden sled, 
"demystified" the religious message conveyed by the City's 
erection of a display commemorating the Birth of Christ and the 
Miracle of the Oils.  We conclude that this simply cannot form 






 Accordingly, we hold that the City of Jersey City's 
display of a crèche and a menorah on the lawn in front of its 
City Plaza violated the Establishment Clause.  We also hold that 
the district court erred in modifying the injunction based upon 
its conclusion that the addition of Frosty, Santa, and a red sled 
"demystified" the religious meaning of the crèche and the menorah 
and rendered the display constitutional.  As such, we vacate the 
district court's modified injunction order and remand the case so 
that the district court can consider, consistent with the 
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McKee, Circuit Judge Concurring.  
 I agree with the reasoning of my colleagues and 
therefore join in their opinion. However, I think it necessary to 
state that I think that our analysis here should be defined by 
the parameters of Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602 (1971). I do not think that Capitol Square Review & 
Advisory Board v. Pinette, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 132 
L.Ed.2d 650 (1995), assists us.  
 In Capitol Square, a “10-acre, state-owned plaza 
surrounding the Statehouse” in the capitol city of Ohio had been 
“used for public speeches, gatherings, and festivals advocating 
and celebrating a variety of causes, both secular and religious” 





available for use by “the public . . . for free discussion of 
public questions, or activities of broad public purpose,” and the 
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board was given the 
responsibility for regulating public access.  (internal 
quotations omitted).  Id. at 2440. That Board rejected a request 
by Donnie Carr, the local leader of the Klu Klux Klan, to erect a 
display consisting of an unattended cross, and Carr appealed to 
the federal courts alleging a violation of the Constitution.  In 
reviewing that decision, the Supreme Court limited itself to the 
Establishment Clause issue even though Carr argued that the 
state’s real reason for rejecting the request was its disapproval 
of the Klan’s political views. Thus, the only issue the Court 
discussed was the state’s right to limit private speech on public 
property that had historically been used as an open public forum. 
 The Court began its analysis by noting that 
“[r]espondents’ religious display in Capitol Square was private 
expression.” Id. at 2446. That expression was clearly entitled to 
protection regardless of content. “[W]e have not excluded from 
free-speech protections religious proselytizing. . . .” Id. The 
city defended its rejection of the requested display by arguing 
that it had an interest in avoiding official endorsement of 
Christianity under the Establishment Clause. The Court relied in 
part upon the “endorsement test” and its prior holding in 
Allegheny and Lynch to reject that position. 
 
We find it peculiar to say that government 
‘promotes’ or ‘favors’ a religious display by 
giving it the same access to a public forum 
that all other displays enjoy. . . . And as a 





we have consistently held that it is no 
violation for government to enact neutral 
policies that happen to benefit religion. 
Id. at 2447. Accordingly, I do not think that Capitol Square 
illuminates our present inquiry. Our analysis does not involve 
private speech. Rather, here, the City itself owned and erected 
the display at issue.  
 Nevertheless, as the majority quite correctly points 
out, Lynch and Allegheny require the result we reach here today. 
Furthermore, as my colleagues note, in Lemon, the Supreme Court 
held that the Establishment Clause requires that state action 1) 
have a secular purpose; 2) have a primary effect that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; and 3) avoid excessive government 
entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. 612-13. I think my 
colleagues’ analysis of Lynch and Allegheny establishes that the 
first display is inconsistent with the prohibitions of Lemon and 
properly remands to determine the legality of the second display. 
Accordingly, I join the opinion with the reservations noted 
herein.  
 
 
 
 
